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COMPARATIVE RISK ANALYSIS IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
THOMAS P. GRUMBLY*
I.  INTRODUCTION
I am delighted to be here to give you my views on how Com-
parative Risk and Public Policy fit together, and more specifically
how the Department of Energy has developed some approaches in
using risk analysis to formulate public policy.  Our Departmental
missions encompass national security; environmental quality; science
and technology; and energy resources.  Over the past three years I
have been directly involved with two of these missions: (1) environ-
mental quality and (2) national security.  I would like to discuss with
you how comparative risk analysis has been one of the tools the De-
partment has  used to define and achieve our goals of keeping nu-
clear materials safe and secure, and reducing urgent risks in the nu-
clear weapons complex.  In our view, comparative risk analysis has
helped us set priorities, select alternatives, allocate resources, and
measure progress.
I would like to describe the road  we’ve taken in risk manage-
ment at the Department of Energy over the past three years,  review
with you what obstacles— both conceptual and institutional—we
have encountered, comment on where we are headed, and discuss
how our risk analysis approaches can be broadly applied to achieve
our national goal for sustainable development.
A.  Risk Issues in the Department of Energy: Why We Need Risk
Analysis
The Department of Energy faces a panoply of risks, many of
which eclipse your “garden variety” risks of typical Superfund and
RCRA sites.  After 45 years of nuclear weapons production testing
and research, we have an extraordinary legacy of environmental
challenges and responsibilities, including:
*  Under Secretary of United States Department of Energy, 1993-97.  Currently Executive
Vice President & President, Federal Programs Group, ICF Kaiser International, Incorporated,
9300 Lee Highway, Fairfax, VA  22031-1207.  This article is based on the text of then Under
Secretary Grumbly’s remarks at the Cummings Colloquium on Environmental Law, November
15, 1996.  As public comments of a Federal official, this article is not covered by the copyright
of this issue.
24 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 8:23
· 3,700 contaminated sites in 34 States and Territories
· Over 1 million gallons of radioactive and mixed waste in 332
tanks
· Over 600 billion gallons of contaminated groundwater
· Almost 3000 tons of spent nuclear fuel, some of which has
been in pools for over 30 years and is now corroding
· Decontaminating and decommissioning 1,200 facilities,
which are contaminated with radioactive and other hazard-
ous materials
· 26 metric tons of plutonium scraps and residues which need
to be stabilized and safeguarded -- enough to make several
thousand thermonuclear warheads -- while protecting the
safety and health of our workers and the public in communi-
ties around our sites.
But the Department’s challenges are not just environmental.
While the end of the Cold War brought about dramatic change, nu-
clear weapons remain a significant threat to the security of our Na-
tion and to the future of our children.  The security challenges now
come from the spread of nuclear materials, technology, and expertise
to those such as terrorist groups and rogue nations who seek to use
them to exert political power.  This Administration and the Depart-
ment of Energy are playing a crucial role in reducing this nuclear
danger and making the world safer through its national security pro-
grams.
Allow me to put “risk” in perspective.  The Department is en-
suring a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing.
We are working internationally to reduce the global nuclear threat by
keeping nuclear bomb fuel out of the reach of hostile nations.  The
Clinton Administration has demonstrated real leadership in moving
the world towards a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—an American
objective since the 1950’s.  The Department of Energy has supported
and enabled the U.S. moratorium on nuclear testing.  In sum, reduc-
ing the danger posed by proliferation is a vital national security mis-
sion for the United States.  The Department is using all its resources
to detect and respond to the threat generated by nuclear smuggling.
Our work is helping guard against the possibility that an Oklahoma
City or World Trade Center bombing in the future could involve a
terrorist’s nuclear device.
You can see that these are real world issues.  Managing these
risks is not an academic exercise, and we have little margin of error to
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get lost in ‘theoretical’ exercises.  But while these challenges are
daunting, they offer great opportunities to public policy makers for
marshaling all our skills and talents to reduce the nuclear danger, en-
sure national security, and protect the environment. There are tre-
mendous opportunities in the government as a whole and in the De-
partment of Energy in particular to use comparative risk analysis as a
tool to set priorities, select alternatives, allocate resources, and
measure progress, with the ultimate goal, set by President Clinton
and Vice President Gore, to develop and deploy technologies to pro-
tect the environment while sustaining economic growth.
II.  RISK MANAGEMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
Let me share with you how we, in practice, have implemented
risk management in the Office of Environmental Management over
the past 3 years.  When the Clinton Administration arrived in 1993,
our first strategic goal was to address urgent risks.  The magnitude of
environmental problems facing the Department has made this a
daunting, but not impossible, task.  In 1993, we had no firm idea of
what the risks were to the public from the extensive contamination
and operations of decades of nuclear weapons production.  Enor-
mous quantities of radioactive, hazardous and mixed wastes exist in
the soil, groundwater, tens of thousands of tanks and canisters, even
in ducts and pipes in our buildings, all in an area that is larger than
Rhode Island, Delaware, and Washington D.C. combined.  To regu-
late these risks, no less than ten major environmental statutes, from
the 1946 Atomic Energy Act to the 1992 Federal Facilities Compli-
ance Act, apply to the Department of Energy.  Further regulation
comes from over 100 binding agreements with the states and EPA,
signed by the Department since 1980, over 70 of which remain in ef-
fect.  As you might gather, there is no one, single consistent frame-
work for considering in an integrated fashion the multiple types of
risks and hazards in the nuclear weapons complex.  Our strategy was
to identify the highest hazards and risks in the complex, and in so
doing, help us establish priorities for action within this vast system.
In reality, we wanted to use risk as a tool to probe the Office of Envi-
ronmental Management program.
In 1993, we requested that the National Academy of Sciences de-
termine whether a risk-based approach to our program would be fea-
sible and desirable.  This was not an insignificant step.  It was contro-
versial for many reasons, not the least of which was  approaching an
outside organization to determine whether such an analysis was fea-
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sible.  The result was a watershed document: the National Research
Council’s Report, Building Consensus.1  It described the four compo-
nents of the risk process as risk assessment; risk management; public
participation; and, policy setting and decision-making.  Building Con-
sensus came to several important conclusions: 1) risk assessment must
be iterative so that the issues stay current; 2) the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission agreed with our contention that who does the risk as-
sessment matters; and 3) credibility is a critical element in both con-
ducting the assessment of risk and reviewing such assessment.  The
primary effect of this report was a significant increase of public par-
ticipation in the risk management and in setting priorities at Depart-
ment of Energy sites.  This Environmental Management experiment
was endorsed in the first draft of the President’s Commission on
Risk.
Another milestone on our road to risk management was the De-
partment’s adoption of a set of risk principles in 1995.  The Depart-
ment of Energy is one of the first government agencies to adopt this
set of risk principles which provide a general framework for risk
analysis which includes risk assessment, risk management, risk com-
munication, and priority setting.  They mirror Building Consensus’s
framework.  These principles are aspirational rather than prescrip-
tive.  Their application requires flexibility and practical judgement.
The practice of risk assessment is rapidly changing and its use is a
function of several factors, including legal mandates and available re-
sources.  The principles are intended to be used as a point of depar-
ture for future efforts.
Another force which shaped our risk policy has been Congres-
sional interest.  Senator Moynihan’s bill in the early 1990’s on com-
parative risk was the first serious piece of legislation that called for
comparative risk in a formal way.  The Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee in 1993 requested a report from Environmental Management
to establish priorities among competing clean-up requirements and to
evaluate the risks to pubic health and safety posed by conditions at
weapons complex facilities that are governed by compliance agree-
ments.  Also, the risk-cost benefit discussions that were the start of
the regulatory reform efforts in the 103rd Congress, as you all know,
really became vigorous in the 104th Congress.
1. EDITOR’S NOTE: See COMMITTEE TO REVIEW RISK MANAGEMENT IN DOE’S
ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION PROGRAM, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, BUILDING
CONSENSUS THROUGH RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY’S ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION PROGRAM (1994).
Fall 1997] COMPARATIVE RISK ANALYSIS 27
DOE’s Risk Report to Congress was the first attempt on a site-
by-site basis to identify the spectrum of risks —public, worker, envi-
ronment— and to qualitatively link these risks to compliance agree-
ments, and to the proposed costs of activities.  Our evaluation indi-
cated that the compliance agreements were addressing our most
important risks.  Moreover, without containment and limited public
access, the Department’s inventory of hazardous and radioactive ma-
terials, sites, and facilities would pose much higher risks.
The Environmental Management Advisory Board, one represen-
tation of our outside public, recommended tying the analysis of risk
activities in a comprehensive way to the annual budget cycle for the
Environmental Management program.  The Board also recom-
mended aggressively seeking both the internal experience of the De-
partment and a critical independent review both during and after this
budget-risk process.
Let me take a moment to detail some of the features of Envi-
ronmental Management’s risk analysis effort.  It was comprehensive
across all Environmental Management activities, which collectively
carry a $6 billion price tag.  It categorized activities with regard to
risks to the public, the workers, and the environment, as well as the
extent of compliance with existing environmental and departmental
regulations, and it linked it to the yearly cost of each activity.  Cate-
gories of activities were then evaluated and analyzed, in terms of
both the severity of impacts and the likelihood of occurrence, to ar-
rive at the three levels of risk: High, Medium, and Low.  In sum, it
was a massive comparative risk analysis, crossing receptors (public,
workers, environment), media, and time (past, present, future activi-
ties).  In setting our sights on such a ground breaking task, we had to
overcome a number of obstacles, which I’d like to share with you
now.
A.  What Were the Obstacles and What Are the Current Obstacles for
Such an Analysis?
One of the major obstacles was how to bring citizens into the
process in a meaningful way.  Prior to 1993, the Department was op-
erating under the principles of the Cold War and public participation
was not actively pursued.  When the Cold War era ended, the De-
partment started to break down the walls of secrecy that had endured
for 50 years.  This Administration has embraced the openness initia-
tive and has actively sought stakeholder participation.
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As part of our commitment to opening up the Department, I re-
quested authority from the Office of Management and Budget to al-
low public participation in our budget formulation process— some-
thing never done before.  It was our belief, with the Administration,
that unless the taxpayer understands how the money is being spent
and what issues are being addressed, the credibility of the decisions
of the Office of Environmental Management could not be improved.
This process allowed citizens the opportunity for real time input into
the decision process.  However, this process was not achieved without
significant difficulties for both internal and external participants,
mainly because of the limited time period that the annual budget
process allows for gathering, processing, and evaluating information
that can then be used to prioritize activities and make decisions.
Each participant wanted more time to complete evaluations, but as
you know, the process to develop the federal annual budget is very
prescriptive and the time slots for submission are very rigid.  How-
ever, opening the process up takes some of the mystique out of how
the activities are prioritized and how each sites’ budget is developed.
Tying the risk information to the annual budget cycle allowed
both citizens and the Department to evaluate the activities and their
associated risks, and showed how risk information could potentially
be used in priority-setting.  The downside, however, was the inflexi-
ble budget cycle.
Secondly, because of the link to the budget, the activities evalu-
ated for risk were those developed to allow budgeting for one-year
increments.  Thus, the scope of the projects to be analyzed was not
consistent across the country, or in some cases, across a site, espe-
cially since the scope of the analysis did not reflect the full project
through which the Department was attempting to address risk.  There
was no way to link total risk with total costs of a project that had spe-
cific start and completion dates defined.
We learned two important lessons in doing our Risk Report and
subsequent risk evaluations.  One is that without senior level man-
agement support, cross-cutting programs and analyses are not suc-
cessful.  Such programs require nurturing in order to successfully fa-
cilitate the coherent, protective change from a rigid compliance-
based program to an open program that is based on establishing pri-
orities with citizens and regulators, and that reduces risk to the pub-
lic, the workers, and the environment in a cost effective manner.
The second is that credible external review, including
peer-review, is essential.  In addition to the reviews by the National
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Academy of Sciences, we encouraged review by the Environmental
Management Advisory Board, both for process and direction, and we
accepted and implemented every one of the resolutions concerning
risk passed by the Board.  We have used outside institutions as one
mechanism to gain credibility for our technical assessments so that
they are acceptable to the scientific and public health communities
and the affected public. Chuck Powers, a representative from one of
those institutions, the Consortium for Risk Evaluation with Stake-
holder Participation (CRESP), is here with us today. We have used
this institution, not only to perform research in risk analysis, but to
undertake peer-review of the Department’s risk evaluations as well.
B.  Where Are We Today and What Is the Path Forward to Overcome
these Obstacles?
Thus far, I’ve shared with you the whys and wherefores of risk
analysis in response to specific needs and opportunities within the
Department of Energy.  But risk analysis has value as a public policy
tool far beyond the needs of just one program or one federal agency.
Comparative risk analysis can and should be integrated with our na-
tional policy goals of protecting the environment while growing our
economy sustainably—what many people refer to as sustainable de-
velopment.
What path are we taking in the Department to overcome these
obstacles?  We will continue to enhance the process of risk evaluation
so that it is consistent across the complex and we can examine all of
the risks at one time -- instead of on a chemical by chemical basis or
only by worker, public, or environment segments -- so that the
“whole risk picture” is evaluated at the site and the option selected
reduces the risk to the lowest acceptable level at the best price to the
taxpayer.
We will continue to champion processes and procedures that en-
hance public participation—all interested parties need to be brought
in early in the decision-making process so that they can influence and
be part of the solution .
We need to ensure credible, continued attention to peer-review
of the processes and procedures used for risk analysis by independent
groups with credibility to citizens and the public as a whole.
We will need to define the scope of the analysis to enable us to
look at the life cycle risks rather than looking at an annual risk or a
“snapshot-in-time” picture.  Once the project is defined, we can
measure our progress toward achieving our goal for the project.  It
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also allows us to be accountable.  This is an ongoing effort in Envi-
ronmental Management now, as projects are being defined under the
Ten Year Plan Initiative.
We must continue to review our decisions and options in an it-
erative manner and incorporate new information or scientific break-
throughs and new technologies to evaluate alternative scenarios, and
perhaps revise our decision.
C.  Examples of How These Approaches Have Worked
We have learned that citizen participation is an essential part of
our decision-making process.  Besides enhancing credibility and ac-
countability, it has proven to be economical and effective.  DOE’s
Fernald Site in Ohio is a large industrial site comparable in scale to
Ford Motor Company’s River Rouge plant.  The Fernald Citizens
Task Force examined and analyzed conditions and risks at the site,
and concluded that different parts of the site would be suitable for
different future uses.  They made recommendations as to the site’s
future land use, cleanup levels, on and off-site waste disposal loca-
tions, and cleanup priorities. As a result of the collaborative process
with the site contractor and the Department, recommendations were
made which will save time in completing the cleanup with an esti-
mated one billion dollars in cost savings over the life of the project.
The second example I want to describe does not have final
resolution as yet, but it illustrates why it is so important to have an
iterative process to review options and alternatives and incorporate
new science and technology where appropriate.  As I have men-
tioned, the Department has large volumes of high-level waste stored
in several hundred tanks.  This tank waste contains many substances
and takes the form of sludges, solids, alkaline or acidic solutions and
slurry phases. The waste volumes contain radioactive cesium and
strontium, difficult substances to remove from solution.  This mix
makes it difficult to reduce the volume of the liquid high-level waste,
which has major implications for the overall costs of managing risks
and this waste.
While researchers supported by the department were developing
an ion exchange material called crystalline silicotitanate (CST) with
application as a catalyst for coal liquification, CST was shown to have
a large affinity for cesium in the presence of high sodium concentra-
tions.  A demonstration selectively removed the cesium and stron-
tium from liquid high-level waste, thereby reducing the amount of
high-level waste requiring special disposal.  The remaining low-level
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waste volumes were separated for more routine treatment and dis-
posal. In addition, the binding was irreversible, and therefore, the
CST with bound cesium and strontium could be considered as a final
waste form.
Such issues have major program implications, as well as regula-
tory implications.  While all of these issues have not been sorted out
yet, it has the potential of reducing risks by reducing both the volume
of the waste and the mobility of the contaminants, and providing sig-
nificant savings in treatment and disposal costs of high-level waste.
We believe that use of risk analysis to compare such alternatives for
impact on human health and the environment is a powerful tool.
This is true especially when risk analysis is linked to the costs of the
alternatives, and will assist decision makers in evaluating all of the
options available for treating the waste.
Thus the risk paradigm has the potential for providing the path
forward not only for Environmental Management and related pro-
grams with radioactive and chemical contamination of the environ-
ment, but in its broadest sense, for sustainable development in the
Twenty-First Century.  We have the means within our grasp to use
the environmental technologies we are developing and have used to
make the bridge to sustainable development across all programs in
DOE.
III.  CONCLUSION
Today, I’ve described for you how the Department of Energy,
particularly in its Environmental Management program, has used
comparative risk analysis to define and achieve our goals of keeping
nuclear materials safe and secure, and to reduce urgent risks at our
weapons production sites across the country.  Comparative risk
analysis has been and will continue to be a valuable tool in setting
priorities, selecting alternatives, allocating resources, and measuring
progress.  It is a tool that can and should be applied to a wide range
of programs and activities.
Comparative risk analysis is a valuable asset in achieving the
right kind of public policy making.  As Edmund Burke said in his Re-
flections on the Revolution in France, “Government is a contrivance
of human wisdom to provide for human wants.  Men  have a right
that these wants should be provided for by this wisdom.”2  It was also
2. EDITOR’S NOTE: See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN
FRANCE 66 (F.G. Selby ed., MacMillan and Co. 1924).
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Edmund Burke who gave us the saying that “politics is the art of
compromise.”3  I would submit to you that comparative risk analysis
enables us to achieve “informed compromise,” to the greater benefit
of each and every one of us, and our children and grandchildren.
3. EDITOR’S NOTE: Probably a derivation of  “All government  … is  founded on
compromise and barter.”  EDMUND BURKE, Speech on Conciliation with America, 22 March,
1775, in 3 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 105, 157 (W.M. Elofson & John
A. Woods eds., 1996).
